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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
LT. GOV. PHIL BRYANT et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity )
as Attorney General of the United States, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
                                                                                )
Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-76-KS-MTP
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART AND FOR JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
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INTRODUCTION
This Court dismissed plaintiffs’ original challenge to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119, 244
(2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A), for lack of standing, with leave to amend.
The Court held that plaintiffs had failed to identify a “certainly impending” injury caused by that
provision, which requires individuals who are not otherwise exempt to maintain a minimum level
of health insurance coverage beginning in 2014. While plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition adds
a front section that was presumably intended to cure the defects that this Court identified in
plaintiffs’ earlier complaint,  the assertions set forth in that new section are not only vague but
internally inconsistent with the original assertions that continue to appear in plaintiffs’ complaint.
Because plaintiffs’ new complaint is insufficiently clear to determine whether it satisfies standing
requirements at the pleading stage or not, for purposes of their general challenge to Congress’s
power, defendants request leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery prior to responding to that
portion of plaintiffs’ new complaint.
The remainder of the claims in the Second Amended Petition should be dismissed
because plaintiffs have failed to establish a plausible basis for standing with respect to those
claims. For one thing, the new assertions made by Lieutenant Governor Bryant fail to establish
that he will be uninsured in 2014, when the minimum coverage provision goes into effect, or that
he will be a state employee. The Lieutenant Governor has therefore failed to establish his
standing to challenge the ACA’s minimum coverage provision either on his own behalf or on
behalf of a class of state employees. Plaintiffs’ new complaint also fails to establish plaintiffs’
standing to assert a substantive due process claim based on medical privacy. Indeed, plaintiffs
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affirmatively assert that they do not intend to purchase health insurance, much less submit any
private information to insurers.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action on April 2, 2010, asserting a number of constitutional
challenges to Congress’s recent enactment of comprehensive health care reform legislation, and
in particular the ACA’s minimum coverage provision. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Petition
on April 9, 2010, adding Lieutenant Governor Bryant as a plaintiff. Defendants moved to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims, arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs lacked standing.
This Court agreed that plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition was insufficient to establish
plaintiffs’ standing and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims with leave to amend on February 3, 2011.
Order of Feb. 3, 2011 (dkt. #26). In regard to the original ten plaintiffs, the Court noted that
plaintiffs did not assert any current injury, id. at 13 n.3, and that their factual allegations were
insufficient to show that the future injury that they asserted – being subject to the penalty set
forth at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A –  was “certainly impending,” Order of Feb. 3, 2011, at 19. In regard
to Lieutenant Governor Bryant, the Court held that plaintiffs had “not pled sufficient facts to
show that [the Lieutenant Governor] will certainly be injured by any purported limitations placed
on the health insurance options available to state employees by the PPACA,” id. at 20-21, and
that plaintiffs had also failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the Lieutenant Governor
would certainly be subject to the § 5000A penalty, id. at 21.
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Petition (hereinafter, “new complaint” or
“amended complaint”) on March 4, 2011. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint purports to address the
Court’s Order of Feb. 3, 2011, by adding sixteen paragraphs at the beginning of the pleading. See
-2-
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Am. Comp. ¶¶ 1-16. With minor exceptions not relevant here, the remainder of plaintiffs’
amended complaint is identical to their First Amended Petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss this action in part pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs bear the burden to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. Davis
v. United States, 597 F.3d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1906 (Mar. 22, 2010)
(citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, the “plausibility
standard” that the Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), applies to standing and ripeness. White v.
United States, 601 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2010); cf. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th
Cir. 2008) (incorporating Twombly standard into 12(b)(1) review). “‘[S]tanding cannot be
inferred . . . from averments in the pleadings, but rather must affirmatively appear in the record.’”
White, 601 F.3d at 551-52 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1998)). “[N]or will
‘naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement’ suffice.” Id. at 552 (quoting Ashcroft,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009)). In other words, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter”
to raise a plausible claim that an Article III case or controversy exists. Id.
Defendants also seek jurisdictional discovery with respect to the ten original plaintiffs’
standing to assert their general challenge to the minimum coverage provision. This Court has
discretion to grant defendants leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. See Freeman v. United
States, 556 F.3d 326, 341 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “control of discovery is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court” (internal quotation omitted)). Jurisdictional discovery is
appropriate where the party seeking discovery “show[s] its necessity” by explaining how
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information sought in discovery could determine the result of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1). Id.; see also Lane, 529 F.3d at 557 (explaining that a court considering a motion to
dismiss under rule 12(b)(1) “may find a plausible set of facts” supporting subject matter
jurisdiction “by considering any of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” (internal quotation omitted)).
ARGUMENT
I. LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR BRYANT LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT ANY
CLAIM IN THIS CASE
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts no additional facts that could support the
Lieutenant Governor’s standing. To establish standing, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege “an
injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation omitted). Where an injury has not yet occurred, a
plaintiff must show that it is “certainly impending.” Order of Feb. 3, 2011, at 18; Babbitt v.
United Farmer Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). In
addition, a plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,” and that the injury is redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61.
The Lieutenant Governor ostensibly seeks to participate in the same general challenge to
Congress’s power to enact the minimum coverage provision that the ten original plaintiffs raise,
as well as his separate challenge in Count Three based on his status as an employee of the State
-4-
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of Mississippi. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 3-13, 42-43, 113. However, this Court has already held that
the allegations in the previous complaint were insufficient to support the Lieutenant Governor’s
standing to assert Count Three. Order of Feb. 3, 2011, at 20-22. The new paragraphs in plaintiffs’
amended complaint do nothing to remedy the defects that the Court identified with respect to
Count Three. Among other things, the Lieutenant Governor fails to remedy the lack of factual
allegations regarding “whether Plaintiff Bryant will, in fact, be a state employee at the time that
these alleged requirements are imposed.” Id. at 20. To the contrary, the Lieutenant Governor now
concedes that his term of office ends prior to the date that the minimum coverage provision goes
into effect and that he therefore cannot predict whether he will be a state employee at that time or
not. Am. Comp. ¶ 13. 
Indeed, despite the fact that Count Three continues to appear in the new complaint, the
Lieutenant Governor seems to have abandoned that claim in favor of focusing on the general
claim asserted by all plaintiffs. See id. (“specifically re-alleg[ing] the facts alleged [with respect
to all plaintiffs] in paragraphs 1-10”). Yet this Court also held in its prior Order that because the
Lieutenant Governor has employer-provided health insurance, “the factual allegations of the Frist
Amended Petition are not sufficient to show that he will certainly suffer economic harm by being
forced to purchase health insurance or by the assessment of a tax penalty.” Order of Feb. 3, 2011,
at 20. Again, the added paragraphs in the amended complaint fail to remedy this defect. 
In particular, while it is established that the Lieutenant Governor currently has insurance,
plaintiffs continue to assert that none of the plaintiffs – necessarily including the Lieutenant
Governor – “possess[es] any form of health insurance.” Am. Comp. ¶ 42. The Lieutenant
Governor also asserts that he “ha[s] no intention whatsoever of complying with the Individual
-5-
Case 2:10-cv-00076-KS-MTP   Document 30    Filed 04/12/11   Page 8 of 19
Mandate or of purchasing health insurance now or in the future.” Am. Comp. ¶¶ 5, 13. Yet, if the
Lieutenant Governor were to remain a state employee – a possibility that the Lieutenant
Governor seems to think just as likely as not, id. ¶ 13  – he would presumably continue to have1
insurance when the minimum coverage provision goes into effect, and that public-employer-
provided insurance could well satisfy the ACA’s requirements. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(B),
(2)(A). On the whole, these directly conflicting assertions in the same pleading undermine the
plausibility of any assertions relevant to Lieutenant Governor’s standing, and certainly do not
suffice to state a plausible claim that any future injury is “certainly impending.” 
Nor can the Lieutenant Governor satisfy standing requirements based on an alleged
present injury. Even assuming that the new complaint’s allegations of present injury were
sufficiently specific and nonconclusory (which, as explained below, they are not), the possibility
that the Lieutenant Governor might incur the § 5000A penalty is far too attenuated to establish
the causation prong of standing with respect to present injury. For the Lieutenant Governor to
incur the penalty (or be affected by the minimum coverage provision at all), his current status
would have to change. Only in the event that the Lieutenant Governor were to (a) lose his next
election, (b) fail to obtain other employment that provides health insurance, and (c) then fail to
replace his current health insurance with an insurance policy that satisfies the minimum coverage
provision might he become subject to the § 5000A penalty in 2014.  To the extent the Lieutenant2
The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the Lieutenant Governor has already1
announced his candidacy for Governor in 2011. See http://philbryant.com/?p=233.
Even then, of course, the Lieutenant Governor would only be subject to the penalty if he2
were ineligible for any of the applicable exemptions. For the same reasons discussed below with
respect to the ten original plaintiffs, the allegations in the new complaint provide an insufficient
factual basis for a plausible claim that the Lieutenant Governor would be subject to the penalty in
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Governor is presently engaged in rearranging his affairs in order to save the amount of money
that could potentially be assessed as a tax penalty, see Am. Comp. ¶¶ 6, 13, his efforts are
directly attributable to a future loss of political office, which is an intervening change that would
presumably be determined by the Mississippi electorate. It is well established that where an
asserted injury is directly attributable to “the intervening choices of third parties,” causation is
lacking. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 941 (D.C. Cir.
2004). Thus, the Lieutenant Governor has failed to satisfy standing requirements for purposes of
plaintiffs’ general challenge to Congress’s power to enact the minimum coverage provision as
well as Count Three.
II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO ASSERT A VIOLATION OF MEDICAL
PRIVACY, AND ANY SUCH CLAIM IS UNRIPE
Plaintiffs’ new complaint reasserts their claim that the minimum coverage provision
violates their right to medical privacy and makes new factual allegations in connection with this
claim. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 15-16. These allegations do not establish plaintiffs’ standing, however.
The ten original plaintiffs allege that “they do not wish to divulge their confidential medical
information to any insurance company.” Id. ¶ 15. However, as previously explained, nothing in
the statutory text of the minimum coverage provision requires private insurance companies to
collect confidential medical information from individuals, nor does it require individuals to
provide such information to insurance companies. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Moreover, these
plaintiffs have specifically alleged that they “intend[] to disobey the PPACA by failing to
purchase health insurance despite the Individual Mandate.” Am. Comp. ¶ 6. Clearly, these
the event that he no longer had employer-provided health insurance.
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plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a “certainly impending” future injury with respect to their
asserted privacy interests, nor have they plausibly alleged that any future transmission of medical
information from themselves to an insurance company is fairly traceable to the minimum
coverage provision. Neither the injury-in-fact nor the causation prongs of standing are satisfied.
Lieutenant Governor Bryant has also failed to establish his standing to assert this claim.
The Lieutenant Governor implicitly acknowledges that he currently provides whatever
information his insurance company requests. See Am. Comp. ¶ 16. In fact, the Lieutenant
Governor does not identify his supposed injury as the disclosure of confidential information at
all. Instead, the injury that the Lieutenant Governor attempts to describe is apparently the notion
that a law might require him to do what he is already doing voluntarily. See id. Aside from the
fact that the law in this case requires no such thing, there is simply no “injury-in-fact” relevant to
medical privacy at issue here. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 755 (2011) (recognizing that, to
the extent any privacy interest might be deemed of constitutional significance, the interest at
issue is the interest in “avoid[ing] unwarranted disclosures” of private information (internal
quotation omitted)).
Even if any plaintiff had standing to raise a medical privacy claim, such a claim would be
unripe. “‘[T]he ripeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because
the injury is speculative and may never occur, from those cases that are appropriate for federal
court action.’” Roark & Hardee LP, 522 F.3d 533, 544 n.12 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4.1 (5th ed. 2007)). A number of factors cast doubt on
whether, once the minimum coverage provision and other ACA provisions go into effect,
insurers are even likely to request medical information during the enrollment process. For one
-8-
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thing, the ACA prohibits insurers from basing coverage determinations on whether an individual
has a pre-existing medical condition. For another, the contours of “minimum essential coverage”
have not yet been set forth by regulation. Because the menu of insurance options is not yet
available, it remains unknown whether plans might be available that specifically address
individual privacy concerns. It is premature to predicate a constitutional ruling on the rigid
assumption that, should plaintiffs enroll in an insurance plan in 2014 (which they claim they will
not do), they inevitably will be required to disclose private information. Plaintiffs’ medical
privacy claim should therefore be dismissed.
III. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY SHOULD BE GRANTED WITH RESPECT TO
THE TEN ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS’ STANDING TO CHALLENGE
CONGRESS’S ENACTMENT OF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
A. Jurisdictional Discovery Is Necessary in Order to Clarify Vague and
Inconsistent Assertions Regarding Plaintiffs’ Standing
Defendants request leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery regarding the ten original
plaintiffs’ standing to challenge Congress’s authority to enact the minimum coverage provision.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not resolve the standing defects that this Court previously
identified. To the contrary, because plaintiffs’ assertions are vague, incomplete, and internally
inconsistent, defendants are unable to determine whether these assertions are sufficient to satisfy
standing at the pleading stage. Discovery regarding the factual circumstances of each of the ten
original plaintiffs in this case is necessary and will promote efficiency by allowing defendants to
determine whether to proceed with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) or to go forward with
briefing on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
As an initial matter, the added paragraphs in plaintiffs’ new complaint create ambiguity in
-9-
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regard to whether any of the original ten plaintiffs might  have some form of insurance that they
did not “purchase.” See Am. Comp. ¶ 6. As explained above, Lieutenant Governor Bryant
incorporates the assertion that he would not “purchase” health insurance even though it is clear
that, if he remains an elected official in 2014, he would continue to have insurance, as he does
now. The same distinction could apply to the other plaintiffs, who may also currently or in the
future “have” health insurance coverage that would preclude them from suffering the injury that
they assert. Indeed, plaintiffs’ new reference in ¶ 15 to “[t]he Petitioners who do not currently
have health insurance” appears to acknowledge that some plaintiffs do currently have health
insurance despite their continued assertion in ¶ 42 (which we know is not true with respect to at
least one plaintiff) that “they do not possess any form of health insurance.” See Am. Comp. ¶¶
15, 42. Jurisdictional discovery on the question of plaintiffs’ health insurance coverage is needed
in order to clarify these issues.
In regard to the question of whether plaintiffs have alleged a plausible current injury, this
Court observed that plaintiffs’ previous complaint did “not allege that they are presently
rearranging their finances or incurring any economic harm.” Order of Feb. 3, 2011, at 13 n.3.
Plaintiffs’ new complaint asserts, without providing any detail specific to any particular plaintiff,
that “[e]ach Petitioner specifically avers that he is currently arranging his financial affairs
differently than he otherwise would,” and that plaintiffs have “ma[d]e significant and costly
changes in their personal financial planning, necessitating significant lifestyle changes and
extensive reorganization of their personal and financial affairs.” Am. Comp. ¶ 7. It is not at all
clear what these vague assertions mean. Without any underlying asserted facts specific to each
plaintiff – such as the nature of each plaintiff’s current employment, income and expenses –
-10-
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these assertions appear to parrot the Court’s order while providing no factual basis on which to
evaluate whether the assertions are plausible.3
In addition, plaintiffs assert in the same paragraph that each plaintiff “is making decisions
to forego certain spending today, so that he will have the funds to pay for the penalties associated
with his noncompliance and the associated legal costs of defending himself for his
noncompliance when the Individual Mandate begins implementation on January 1, 2014.” Am.
Comp. ¶ 7. This assertion actually undermines plaintiffs’ standing because the minimum
coverage provision does not require plaintiffs to incur any legal costs. Even if plaintiffs are
covered individuals in 2014 and incur the § 5000A penalty for failing to maintain the required
level of health insurance coverage, as they allege they will, no legal proceeding would take place
that would require plaintiffs to retain legal representation. Rather, the penalty for a given year is
assessed on an individual’s tax return for that year, and an individual would simply add the
penalty amount to the amount of taxes owed in that year. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs are
currently changing their spending habits in order to save money for legal fees, they fail to claim a
present injury fairly traceable to the minimum coverage provision. 
Thus, plaintiffs’ amended  complaint is at best ambiguous in regard to present injury.
Indeed, without further detail, there is reason to question the plausibility of the assertion that each
of the ten original plaintiffs would be forced to rearrange financial affairs or change spending
Indeed, in regard to both present and future injury, plaintiffs’ “naked assertion[s] devoid3
of further factual enhancement” do not meet the pleading standard required under Twombly and
Iqbal. See White, 601 F.3d at 552 (internal quotation omitted). The Court would therefore be
justified in dismissing this case in its entirety. In the alternative, jurisdictional discovery is
warranted in order to explore whether a plausible factual basis exists for plaintiffs’ general
assertions.
-11-
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habits now in order to prepare to pay a penalty assessed under § 5000A and payable with taxes
for 2014 and following years. Under the phase-in contemplated by the ACA, the annual penalty
amount could be as low as $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and $695 in following years, depending on
the taxpayer’s household income and whether the taxpayer fails to maintain minimum essential
coverage for himself only, or for a spouse and children as well. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c).
Without details concerning plaintiffs’ financial circumstances, it is not immediately clear
whether any plaintiff, though allegedly ineligible for any hardship exemption under the Act,
could plausibly claim to be rearranging financial affairs or forgoing spending in the present to
prepare for such penalties, the first of which would be payable in April 2015.  Jurisdictional4
discovery regarding details such as those described (employment, income, expenses), as well as
whether other factors (such as anticipated legal fees) are the true cause of any changes in
spending or financial planning, is necessary in order to determine whether plaintiffs have
plausibly alleged standing on this basis.
In regard to future injury, the Court’s Order explained that plaintiffs’ assertion in their
prior complaint that they would certainly be subject to the minimum coverage provision in 2014
was “a bare legal conclusion which the Court may not accept as true.” Order of Feb. 3, 2011, at
19. However, plaintiffs’ new assertions are themselves little more than a list of additional bare
legal conclusions, and to the extent these assertions contain facts, these facts are insufficient and,
The amount of the potential penalty that any given plaintiff might incur in 2014,4
assuming that the plaintiff failed to comply with the minimum coverage provision for the
duration of the year, would be the greater of the applicable “flat dollar amount” – which in 2014
would be $95 if only the plaintiff failed to maintain minimum essential coverage, $190 if two
members of the plaintiff’s household failed to comply, or $285 if three or more members of a
plaintiff’s household failed to comply – or 1% of the amount of the plaintiff’s household income
that exceeds the filing threshold amount for that year. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)-(3).
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at times, inconsistent with other facts asserted in the amended complaint. Plaintiffs simply
attempt to replace a single blanket legal conclusion – that they will be subject to the minimum
coverage provision in 2014 – with an entire set of legal conclusions – that they will not qualify
for any of the various possible exceptions to the minimum coverage provision in 2014, and will
therefore be subject to the provision. Thus, plaintiffs simply assert, in rote manner, that they will
not qualify for the exceptions set forth in § 5000A(d)(2), (3) or (4). Am. Comp. ¶¶ 9-10. 
Plaintiffs further assert that they will not qualify for the exemptions set forth in §
5000A(e)(1) and (2), which would depend on plaintiffs’ income level in 2014. Am. Comp. ¶ 11.
While plaintiffs make the bald statement that their current income is above the applicable
threshold if the minimum coverage provision were in effect today, plaintiffs provide no specific
facts from which one could infer that plaintiffs’ future income will be at a certain level. Indeed,
an assertion about the future is not a “fact” that can be proven, but an inference that can only be
based on provable facts about the present. The mere fact that an individual has an income above
some minimum level today – with no additional facts, for example, about employment, salary, or
any sources of income that existed only in the current year – does not lead to a plausible
inference about that individual’s income three years in the future. Along similar lines, plaintiffs’
allegation “that they have not been determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship” that would qualify them for an
exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(5) has little significance since – due to the fact that the
minimum coverage provision is not yet in effect – the Secretary has not yet made any hardship
determinations at all. Plaintiffs have alleged no specific factual details about the present from
which it might be inferred that the Secretary would not determine that they qualify for a hardship
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exemption when the time comes for the Secretary to make such determinations. Jurisdictional
discovery exploring such additional facts about the present is necessary in order to determine
whether plaintiffs’ allegations about the future nonapplicability of legally-defined exceptions are
plausible. 
B. Jurisdictional Discovery Is Appropriate at this Stage
Under the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate for the Court to grant defendant
leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery as described above before responding to plaintiffs’
challenge to Congress’s authority to enact the minimum coverage provision. Admittedly,
requests for jurisdictional discovery are more frequently submitted by plaintiffs in a case, in
response to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). Here, however, the facts relevant to
plaintiffs’ standing – which include their financial, employment, and insurance status – are
within plaintiffs’ exclusive control and cannot otherwise be accessed by defendants. In addition,
this case has been ongoing for nearly a year, and the parties have already been through a round of
dispositive motion briefing. It would therefore not be premature to begin discovery on
jurisdictional issues. 
Defendants here require written jurisdictional discovery in order to sort out the vague and
inconsistent assertions in plaintiffs’ amended  complaint. Information obtained through such
discovery may be considered by the Court if defendants then proceed with a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). See Davis, 597 F.3d at 649. On the other hand, if,
following jurisdictional discovery, defendants do not file a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), the parties may proceed to briefing on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. Jurisdictional
discovery at this stage will therefore promote judicial economy and efficiency.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants therefore respectfully request that this Court (1)
dismiss Lieutenant Governor Bryant as a party to this case, (2) dismiss plaintiffs’ medical privacy
claim, and (3) grant leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery in connection with the ten original
plaintiffs’ challenge to Congress’s authority, order the parties to confer and submit a proposed
schedule for such discovery, and extend defendants’ deadline within which to respond to
plaintiffs’ amended  complaint with respect to that challenge up to and including 30 days from
the conclusion of jurisdictional discovery.
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